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Abstract
Decentralized optimization of distributed stochastic differential systems has been an active area of
research for over half a century. Its formulation utilizing static team and person-by-person optimality
criteria is well investigated. However, the results have not been generalized to nonlinear distributed
stochastic differential systems possibly due to technical difficulties inherent with decentralized decision
strategies.
In this first part of the two-part paper, we derive team optimality and person-by-person optimality
conditions for distributed stochastic differential systems with different information structures. The op-
timality conditions are given in terms of a Hamiltonian system of equations described by a system of
coupled backward and forward stochastic differential equations and a conditional Hamiltonian, under
both regular and relaxed strategies. Our methodology is based on the semi martingale representation
theorem and variational methods. Throughout the presentation we discuss similarities to optimality
conditions of centralized decision making.
Index Terms. Team and Person-by-Person Optimality, Stochastic Differential Systems, Stochas-
tic Maximum Principle, Relaxed Strategies.
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2I. INTRODUCTION
Over the last 50 years many mathematical concepts and procedures were developed to design
optimal control strategies for stochastic dynamical systems. We refer to this set of mathematical
concepts and procedures as the ”classical theory of stochastic optimization”. It has been uti-
lized extensively to address the questions of existence of optimal strategies, and necessary and
sufficient optimality conditions for systems driven by continuous martingale processes (Brow-
nian motion processes), and discontinuous martingale processes (jump processes). It has been
successfully applied to centralized fully observable control problems, meaning the admissible
strategies are functions of a common noiseless measurements of the system [1]–[9], and to
centralized partially observable control systems, meaning the admissible strategies are functions
of common noisy measurements of the system [2], [10]–[13]. In addition, optimility conditions
are derived for infinite dimensional systems and impulsive systems in [4], [9], [14]. Thus, the
classical theory of optimization is developed on the assumption of centralized decisions or control
actions. It presupposes that all information about the system can be acquired and accordingly the
decision policies (control actions) can be formulated. The basic underlying assumption is that
the acquisition of the information is centralized or the information acquired at different locations
is communicated to each decision maker or control.
When the system model consists of multiple decision makers, and the acquisition of in-
formation and its processing is decentralized or shared among several locations, the decision
makers actions are based on different information. We call the information available for such
decisions, ”decentralized information structures or patterns”. When the system model is dynamic,
consisting of an interconnection of at least two subsystems, and the decisions are based on
decentralized information structures, we call the overall system a ”distributed system with
decentralized information structures”. Over the years several specific forms of decentralized
information structures are analyzed mostly in discrete-time [15]–[26], and more recently [27]–
[32]. However, at this stage there is no systematic framework addressing optimality conditions for
distributed systems with decentralized information structures. The absence of such optimization
theory raises the question whether the classical theory of optimization is limited in mathematical
concepts and procedures to deal with decentralized systems.
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Fig. 1. Diagram of architecture for distributed stochastic differential decision systems.
In this first part of the two-part investigation, we show that the classical theory of optimization
does not have such a limitation. We consider a team game reward [23], [26], [33]–[35] and
we apply concepts from the classical theory of optimization to derive necessary and sufficient
optimality conditions for nonlinear stochastic distributed systems with decentralized information
structures. Our methodology utilizes the semi martingale representation theorem and variational
methods recently reported by the authors in [36].
The optimality conditions developed in this paper can be applied to many architectures of
distributed systems such as Fig. 1 (see also [37]). Each decision maker makes its decision based
on local information and exerts control action that affects the overall distributed system, without
allowing communication between the local decision makers. Such systems are called distributed
systems with decentralized information structures. The team formulation of the distributed system
with decentralized information structures, consists of an interconnection of N subsystems. Each
subsystem i has its state denoted by xi ∈ Xi, a local decision maker or control input ui ∈ Ai, an
exogenous Brownian motion noise input W i ∈Wi, and a coupling from the other subsystem.
Decentralized Information Structures for Decision Makers
The information structures of the local decision makers ui, i = 1, 2, . . . , N are defined as
follows. For any t ∈ [0, T ], the information structure available to decision maker (DM) ui is
modeled by the σ−algebra Gi0,t generated by the observable events associated with the local
subsystem. These observables can be generated by nonanticipative functionals of the noise
entering the system, nonanticipative functions of the state of the system, its delayed versions, or
any possible combinations thereof. Let us denote the admissible strategies of ui with action spaces
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4Ai, by Ui[0, T ], i = 1, 2, . . . , N (meaning that ui is a nonanticipative measurable functional of
the information algebra GiT
△
= {Gi0,t : t ∈ [0, T ]} taking values from Ai. Thus the augmented
state, control and noise of the decentralized system can be written as
x
△
= (x1, x2, . . . , xN ) ∈ X(N), u
△
= (u1, u2, . . . , uN) ∈ A(N), W
△
= (W 1,W 2, . . . ,WN) ∈W(N).
Then the overall system can be expressed in compact form by the following stochastic Itoˆ
differential equation
dx(t) = f(t, x(t), ut)dt+ σ(t, xt, ut)dW (t), x(0) = x0, t ∈ (0, T ]. (1)
Team Game Pay-off Functional
The objective is to find a team optimal strategy uo ≡ (u1,o, . . . , uN,o) ∈ ×Ni=1Ui[0, T ] at which
the pay-off functional defined by
J(uo) ≡ J(u1,o, . . . , uN,o)
△
= inf
(u1...uN )∈×Ni=1U
i[0,T ]
E
{∫ T
0
ℓ(t, x(t), u(t))dt+ ϕ(x(T ))
}
(2)
attains its minimum.
We consider two main classes of decentralized noiseless information structures; 1) nonantic-
ipative functionals of any subset of the sybsystems Brownian motions {W 1, . . . ,WN}, called
”nonanticipative information structures”, and 2) nonanticipative functionals of any subset of the
subsystem states {x1, . . . , xN}, called ”feedback information structures” (see Section II-C).
Team Game Optimality Conditions
In Section V we derive team optimality conditions (Theorem 9) for pay-off (2) subject to (1),
under a strong formulation of the filtered probability space
(
Ω,F, {F0,t : t ∈ [0, T ]},P
)
. These
are summarized below.
Define the Hamiltonian
H : [0, T ]× X(N) × X(N) × L(W(N),XN))× A(N) −→ R
by
H(t, ξ, ζ,M, ν)
△
= 〈f(t, ξ, ν), ζ〉+ tr(M∗σ(t, ξ, ν)) + ℓ(t, ξ, ν), t ∈ [0, T ]. (3)
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5For any u ∈ U(N) ≡ ×Ni=1Ui[0, T ], consider the adjoint process {ψ,Q} and the state x satisfying
the following backward and forward stochastic differential equations respectively,
dψ(t) = −Hx(t, x(t), ψ(t), Q(t), ut)dt+Q(t)dW (t), ψ(T ) = ϕx(x(T )), t ∈ [0, T ), (4)
dx(t) = Hψ(t, x(t), ψ(t), Q(t), ut)dt+ σ(t, x(t), ut)dW (t), x(0) = x0, t ∈ (0, T ]. (5)
The stochastic optimality conditions of the team game with decentralized noiseless information
structures are given below.
(1) Necessary Conditions. Under certain conditions, which are precisely those of the
classical theory of optimization, the following hold.
For an element uo ∈ U(N) ≡ ×Ni=1Ui[0, T ] with the corresponding solution xo to be
team optimal, it is necessary that the following hold:
The process {ψo, Qo} is the unique solution of the backward stochastic differential equa-
tion (4) corresponding to the pair {uo, xo} and that they together satisfy the point wise
almost sure inequalities with respect to the σ-algebras Gi0,t, t ∈ [0, T ], i = 1, 2, . . . , N :
E
{
H(t, xo(t), ψo(t), Qo(t), u1,ot , . . . , u
i−1,o
t , u
i, ui+1,ot , . . . , u
N,o
t )|G
i
0,t
}
≥E
{
H(t, xo(t), ψo(t), Qo(t), u1,ot , . . . , u
i−1,o
t , u
i,o
t , u
i+1,o
t , . . . , u
N,o
t )|G
i
0,t
}
,
∀ui ∈ Ai, a.e.t ∈ [0, T ], P|Gi0,t − a.s., i = 1, 2, . . . , N. (6)
(2) Sufficient Conditions. Under global convexity of the Hamiltonian with respect to the
state and control variables and convexity of the terminal pay-off function ϕ(·) the pair
{xo(·), uo(·)} is optimal if it satisfies (6).
An important feature obtained during the derivation is that the optimality conditions for a team
optimal strategy are equivalent to the optimality conditions for a person-by-person optimal
strategy. This follows from Theorem 6 and Corollary 1.
The point to be made regarding the derivation of the above optimality conditions, is that
we convert the problem into a centralized problem with the associated Hamiltonian system of
equations to capture the constraints, and only at the final step, the optimality of decentralized
strategies is addressed, by identifying the conditional variational Hamiltonian which is consistent
with the decentralized information structures. That is, the Hamiltonian system (4), (5) is the one
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6corresponding to centralized strategies, while the conditional Hamiltonian (6) is the projection
of the centralized Hamiltonian onto the subspace generated by the decentralized information
structures.
We conclude the preliminary discussion on classical optimization theory of centralized strate-
gies versus decentralized strategies, by stating that there are no limitations in applying classical
theory of optimization to distributed systems with decentralized information structures. Rather,
the challenge is in the computation of the conditional Hamiltonians, and hence the optimal
strategies. However, this has also remained a challenge for centralized fully or partially observed
strategies.
The specific objectives of this paper are the following.
(a) Derive team games necessary conditions of optimality (stochastic maximum principle)
for distributed stochastic differential systems with decentralized information structures.
(b) Introduce assumptions so that the team games necessary conditions of optimality in (a)
are also sufficient;
(c) Derive person-by-person optimality conditions and discuss their relation with team
optimality conditions;
(d) Prove existence of optimal team and person-by-person strategies for distributed stochas-
tic differential systems with decentralized information structures, using the theory of
relaxed control strategies, and relate (a), (b), (c) to regular decision strategies.
A detailed investigation of applications of the results of this part to specific linear and nonlinear
distributed stochastic differential decision systems is discussed in the second part of this two-part
paper [38] where we derive the explicit expressions for the optimal decentralized strategies.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II we formulate the distributed
stochastic differential system with decentralized information structures. In Section III, we con-
sider the question of existence of optimal relaxed controls (decisions). In Section IV, we develop
the stochastic optimality conditions for team games with decentralized information structures,
consisting of necessary and sufficient conditions of optimality. In Section V, we specialize the
necessary and sufficient optimality conditions to regular strategies and obtain corresponding
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7necessary and sufficient optimality conditions. The paper is concluded with some comments on
possible extensions of our results.
II. TEAM GAMES OF STOCHASTIC DIFFERENTIAL SYSTEMS
In this section we introduce the mathematical formulation of distributed stochastic systems, the
information structures available to the decision makers for their actions, and the definitions of
collaborative decisions via team game optimality and person-by-person optimality. Throughout
the terms ”decision maker” or ”control” are used interchangeably. A stochastic dynamical de-
cision or control system is called distributed if it consists of an interconnection of at least two
subsystems and decision makers. The underlying assumption for these distributed systems is
that the decision makers actions are based on decentralized information structures. However, the
decision makers are allowed to exchange information on their law or strategy deployed, e.g., the
functional form of their strategies but not their actions.
Some Basic Terminologies
DM Abbreviation for ”Decision Maker”
ZN
△
= {1, 2, . . . , N} subset of natural numbers
s
△
= {s1, s2, . . . , . . . , sN} set consisting of N elements
s−i = s \ {si}, s = (s−i, si) set s minus {si}
L(X ,Y) linear transformation mapping a vector space X
into a vector space Y
A(i) ith column of a map A ∈ L(Rn,Rm), i = 1, . . . , n
(Ai, d) separable metric space for player i ∈ ZN actions
A(N)
△
= ×Ni=1A
i product action space of N players
Uireg[0, T ] regular admissible strategy of player i ∈ ZN
Uirel[0, T ] relaxed admissible strategy of player i ∈ ZN
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8Let
(
Ω,F, {F0,t : t ∈ [0, T ]},P
)
denote a complete filtered probability space satisfying the
usual conditions [39], that is, (Ω,F,P) is complete, F0,0 contains all P-null sets in F. Note that
filtrations {F0,t : t ∈ [0, T ]} are monotone in the sense that F0,s ⊆ F0,t, ∀0 ≤ s ≤ t ≤ T .
Moreover, {F0,t : t ∈ [0, T ]} is called right continuous if F0,t = F0,t+
△
=
⋂
s>t F0,s, ∀t ∈ [0, T )
and it is called left continuous if F0,t = F0,t−
△
= σ
(⋃
s<t F0,s
)
, ∀t ∈ (0, T ]. Throughout the paper
filtrations are denoted by FT
△
= {F0,t : t ∈ [0, T ]}, and they are assumed to be right continuous
and complete.
Consider a random process {z(t) : t ∈ [0, T ]} defined on the filtered probability space
(Ω,F, {F0,t : t ∈ [0, T ]},P) and taking values in a metric space (Z, d). The process {z(t) : t ∈
[0, T ]} is said to be measurable if the map (t, ω)→ z(t, ω) is B([0, T ])× F/B(Z)−measurable
where B(Z) denotes the Borel algebra of subsets of Z. The process {z(t) : t ∈ [0, T ]} is said to be
{F0,t : t ∈ [0, T ]}−adapted if for all t ∈ [0, T ], the map ω → z(t, ω) is F0,t/B(Z)−measurable.
The process {z(t) : t ∈ [0, T ]} is said to be {F0,t : t ∈ [0, T ]}−progresively measurable if for all
t ∈ [0, T ], the map (s, ω)→ z(s, ω) is B([0, t])⊗F0,t/B(Z)−measurable. It can be shown that any
stochastic process {z(t) : t ∈ [0, T ]} on a filtered probability space (Ω,F, {F0,t : t ∈ [0, T ]},P)
which is measurable and adapted has a progressively measurable modification [39]. Unless
otherwise specified, we shall say a process {z(t) : t ∈ [0, T ]} is {F0,t : t ∈ [0, T ]}−adapted if
the processes is {F0,t : t ∈ [0, T ]}−progressively measurable.
In our derivations we make extensive use of the following spaces considered by the authors
in [36]. Let L2
FT
([0, T ],Rn) ⊂ L2(Ω × [0, T ], dP × dt,Rn) ≡ L2([0, T ], L2(Ω,Rn)) denote the
space of FT−adapted random processes {z(t) : t ∈ [0, T ]} such that
E
∫
[0,T ]
|z(t)|2
Rn
dt <∞,
which is a sub-Hilbert space of L2([0, T ], L2(Ω,Rn)). Similarly, let L2
FT
([0, T ],L(Rm,Rn)) ⊂
L2([0, T ], L2(Ω,L(Rm,Rn))) denote the space of FT−adapted n × m matrix valued random
processes {Σ(t) : t ∈ [0, T ]} such that
E
∫
[0,T ]
|Σ(t)|2L(Rm,Rn)dt
△
= E
∫
[0,T ]
tr(Σ∗(t)Σ(t))dt <∞.
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9A. Regular Strategies
In this subsection we consider measurable vector valued functions, also known as regular
strategies. We consider the strong formulation. Let
(
Ω,F, {F0,t : t ∈ [0, T ]},P
)
denote a fixed
complete filtered probability space on which are based all random processes considered in the
paper. At this stage we do not specify how {F0,t : t ∈ [0, T ]} came about, but we require that
Brownian motions are adapted to this filtration.
Admissible Decision Maker Strategies
The Decision Makers (DM) {ui : i ∈ ZN} take values in a closed convex subset of linear
metric spaces {(Mi, d) : i ∈ ZN}. Let GiT
△
= {Gi0,t : t ∈ [0, T ]} ⊂ {F0,t : t ∈ [0, T ]} denote the
information available to DM i, ∀i ∈ ZN . The admissible set of regular strategies is defined by
U
i
reg[0, T ]
△
=
{
ui ∈ L2
Gi
T
([0, T ],Rdi) : uit ∈ A
i ⊂ Rdi , a.e.t ∈ [0, T ], P− a.s.
}
, ∀i ∈ ZN . (7)
Clearly, Uireg[0, T ] is a closed convex subset of L2FT ([0, T ],R
di), for i = 1, 2, . . . , N . That is,
ui : [0, T ]× Ω→ Ai, and {uit : t ∈ [0, T ]} is GiT−adapted, ∀i ∈ ZN .
An N tuple of DM strategies is by definition (u1, u2, . . . , uN) ∈ U(N)reg [0, T ]
△
= ×Ni=1U
i
reg[0, T ],
which are nonanticipative with respect to the information structures {Gi0,t : t ∈ [0, T ]}, i =
1, 2, . . . , N . Hence, the information structure of each DM, GiT , is decentralized, and may be
generated by local or global subsystem observables. Nonanticipative strategies are often utilized
when deriving the minimum principle for centralized stochastic control or decision systems [8].
Distributed Stochastic Systems
Given a fixed probability space
(
Ω,F, {F0,t : t ∈ [0, T ]},P
)
, a distributed stochastic system
consists of an interconnection of N subsystems. Each subsystem i has its own state space Rni ,
action space Ai ⊂ Rdi , an exogenous noise space Wi △= Rmi , and an initial state xi(0) = xi0,
identified by the following quantities.
(S1) xi(0) = xi0: an Rni-valued Random Variable;
(S2) {W i(t) : t ∈ [0, T ]}: an Rmi-valued standard Brownian motion which models the
exogenous state noise, adapted to FT , independent of xi(0).
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Each subsystem is described by a finite dimensional system of coupled stochastic differential
equations of Itoˆ type as follows.
dxi(t) =f i(t, xi(t), uit)dt+ σ
i(t, xi(t), uit)dW
i(t) +
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
f ij(t, xj(t), ujt)dt
+
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
σij(t, xj(t), ujt)dW
j(t), xi(0) = xi0, t ∈ (0, T ], i ∈ ZN . (8)
On the product space (X(N),A(N),W(N)), where X(N) △= ×Ni=1Rni,A(N)
△
= ×Ni=1A
i,W(N)
△
=
×Ni=1R
mi
, one defines the augmented vectors by
W
△
= (W 1,W 2, . . . ,WN) ∈ Rm, u
△
= (u1, u2, . . . , uN) ∈ Rd, x
△
= (x1, x2, . . . , xN) ∈ Rn.
Then on the product space the distributed system is described in compact form by
dx(t) = f(t, x(t), ut)dt+ σ(t, x(t), ut) dW (t), x(0) = x0, t ∈ (0, T ], (9)
where f : [0, T ]×Rn×A(N) −→ Rn denotes the drift and σ : [0, T ]×Rn×A(N) −→ L(Rm,Rn)
the diffusion coefficients. Note that (9) is very general since no specific interconnection structure
is assumed among the different subsystems.
Pay-off Functional
Consider the distributed system (9) with decentralized full information structures. Given a
u ∈ U
(N)
reg [0, T ], we define the reward or performance criterion by
J(u) ≡ J(u1, u2, . . . , uN)
△
= E
{∫ T
0
ℓ(t, x(t), ut)dt+ ϕ(x(T )
}
, (10)
where ℓ : [0, T ]×Rn×U(N) −→ (−∞,∞] denotes the integrand for the running cost functional
and ϕ : Rn −→ (−∞,∞], the terminal cost function. Notice that the performance of the
decentralized system is measured by a single pay-off functional. The interpretation is that there
is a centralized layer where the quality of individual decision makers strategies are evaluated for
a common goal. Therefore, the underlying assumption concerning the single pay-off instead of
multiple pay-offs (one for each decision maker) is that the team objective can be met.
For deterministic as well as stochastic systems, it is well known that if the set Ai is not convex,
there may not exist any optimal control. For this reason it is necessary to introduce relaxed
strategies as discussed in the next subsection.
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B. Relaxed Strategies
This paper will focus on relaxed strategies (also called randomized strategies) and later on
specialize to regular strategies (measurable functions). Therefore, we introduce the formulation
based on relaxed strategies (e.g. probability measures on the action space).
Distributed Stochastic Systems
For each i ∈ ZN , let (Mi, d) be a separable metric space with Ai ⊂ Mi compact, and let
B(Ai) denote the Borel subsets of Ai. Let C(Ai) denote the space of continuous functions
on Ai. Let M(Ai) denote the space of regular bounded signed Borel measures on B(Ai) and
M1(A
i) ⊂M(Ai) the space of regular probability measures. The DM strategies with different
information structures on the time interval [0, T ] will be described through the topological
dual of the Banach space L1
Gi
T
([0, T ], C(Ai)), the L1-space of GiT
△
= {Gi0,t : t ∈ [0, T ]]}−
adapted C(Ai) valued functions, for i ∈ ZN . For each i ∈ ZN the dual of this space is
given by L∞
Gi
T
([0, T ],M(Ai)) which consists of weak∗ measurable GiT adapted M(Ai) valued
functions. The DM (control) strategies are drawn from the subspace L∞
Gi
T
([0, T ],M1(A
i)) ⊂
L∞
Gi
T
([0, T ],M(Ai)). For convenience notation we denote this by
U
i
rel[0, T ]
△
= L∞Gi
T
([0, T ],M1(A
i)), i ∈ ZN , (11)
and the team strategies by the product space
U
(N)
rel [0, T ]
△
= ×Ni=1U
i
rel[0, T ], M1(A
N))
△
= ×Ni=1M1(A
i).
Thus, for any i ∈ ZN , given the information GiT , player {uit : t ∈ [0, T ]} is a stochastic kernel
(conditional distribution) defined by
uit(Γ) = q
i
t(Γ|G
i
0,t), for t ∈ [0, T ], and ∀Γ ∈ B(Ai).
Clearly, for each i ∈ ZN and for every ϕ ∈ C(Ai) the process∫
Ai
ϕ(ξ)uit(dξ) =
∫
Ai
ϕ(ξ)qit(dξ|G
i
0,t), t ∈ [0, T ],
is GiT− progressively measurable. Given a u ∈ U
(N)
rel [0, T ], the distributed system is written in
compact form as
dx(t) = f(t, x(t), ut)dt+ σ(t, x(t), ut)dW (t), x(0) = x0, t ∈ [0, T ], (12)
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where the drift and diffusion coefficient is now defined by
F (t, x, ut)
△
=
∫
A(N)
(
b(t, x, ξ1, ξ2, . . . , ξN)
)
×Ni=1 u
i
t(dξ
i)dt, t ∈ [0, T ), (13)
for F = {f, σ},
Pay-off Functional
Given a u ∈ U(N)rel [0, T ] the performance criterion is defined by
J(u)
△
= E
{∫ T
0
ℓ(t, x(t), ut)dt+ ϕ(x(T ))
}
(14)
≡ E
{∫ T
0
∫
A(N)
(
ℓ(t, x(t), ξ1, ξ2, . . . , ξN)
)
×Ni=1 u
i
t(dξ
i)dt+ ϕ(x(T ))
}
(15)
where ℓ and ϕ are as defined before.
C. Team and Person-by-Person Optimality
In this section we give the precise definitions of team and person-by-person (i.e., player-
by-player) optimality for relaxed and regular strategies. There are many possible information
structures for control strategies {ui : i ∈ ZN}. We consider the following.
(NIS): Nonanticipative Information Structures. Decision ui is adapted to the filtration
GiT ⊂ FT which is generated by the σ− algebra induced by any combination of the subsystems
Brownian motions and their increments {(W 1(t),W 2(t), . . . ,WN(t)) : t ∈ [0, T ]}, ∀i ∈ ZN .
This is often called open loop information, and it is the one used in classical stochastic control
with centralized full information to derive the maximum principe [8].
(FIS): Feedback Information Structures. Decision ui is adapted to the filtration GziT gen-
erated by the σ−algebra Gzi0,t
△
= σ{zi(s) : 0 ≤ s ≤ t}, t ∈ [0, T ], where the observables zi are
nonanticipative measurable functionals of any combination of the states defined by
zi(t) = hi(t, x), hi : [0, T ]× C([0, T ],Rn) −→ Rki, i ∈ ZN . (16)
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Note that the state x and hence the observables zi may depend on controls.
The set of admissible regular feedback strategies is defined by
U
(N),z
reg [0, T ]
△
=
{
u ∈ U(N)reg [0, T ] : u
i
t is Gz
i
0,t −measurable, t ∈ [0, T ], i = 1, . . . , N
}
. (17)
Similarly, the set of admissible relaxed feedback strategies is defined by
U
(N),z
rel [0, T ]
△
=
{
u ∈ U
(N)
rel [0, T ] : u
i ∈ L∞
Gz
i
T
([0, T ],M1(A
i)), i = 1, . . . , N
}
. (18)
One might be tempted to believe that nonanticipative strategies might be restrictive, because they
are not explicitly described in terms of feedback. We will show that this is not true. In fact such
strategies cover a large number of interesting problems.
Problem 1. (Team Optimality)
(RS): Relaxed Strategies. Given the pay-off functional (14), constraint (12) the N tuple of
relaxed strategies uo △= (u1,o, u2,o, . . . , uN,o) ∈ U(N)rel [0, T ] is called nonanticipative team optimal
if it satisfies
J(u1,o, u2,o, . . . , uN,o) ≤ J(u1, u2, . . . , uN), ∀u
△
= (u1, u2, . . . , uN) ∈ U
(N)
rel [0, T ] (19)
Any uo ∈ U(N)rel [0, T ] satisfying (19) is called an optimal relaxed decision strategy (or control)
and the corresponding xo(·) ≡ x(·; uo(·)) (satisfying (12)) the optimal state process.
Similarly, feedback team optimal strategies are defined with respect to uo ∈ U(N),zrel [0, T ]
(NRS): Regular Strategies. Regular nonanticipative team optimal strategies are defined
with respect to pay-off (10), constraint (9), and uo ∈ U(N)reg [0, T ], while feedback team optimal
strategies are defined with respect to uo ∈ U(N),zreg [0, T ].
By definition, Problem 1 is a dynamic team problem with each DM having a different
information structure (decentralized). To the best of the authors knowledge there seems to have
been no attempt in the literature to address the Problem 1. An alternative approach to handle
such problems with decentralized information structures is to restrict the definition of optimality
to the so-called person-by-person (player-by-player) equilibrium.
Define
J˜(v, u−i)
△
= J(u1, u2, . . . , ui−1, v, ui+1, . . . , uN)
June 16, 2018 DRAFT
14
Problem 2. (Person-by-Person Optimality)
(RS): Relaxed Strategies. Given the pay-off functional (14), constraint (12) the N tuple of
relaxed strategies uo △= (u1,o, u2,o, . . . , uN,o) ∈ U(N)rel [0, T ] is called nonanticipative person-by-
person optimal if it satisfies
J˜(ui,o, u−i,o) = J(uo) ≤ J˜(ui, u−i,o), ∀ui ∈ Uireg[0, T ], ∀i ∈ ZN . (20)
Similarly, feedback person-by-person optimal strategies are defined with respect to uo ∈ U(N),zrel [0, T ].
(NRS): Regular Strategies. Regular nonanticipative person-by-person optimal strategies are
defined with respect to pay-off (10), constraint (9), and uo ∈ U(N)reg [0, T ], while feedback person-
by-person optimal strategies are defined with respect to uo ∈ U(N),zreg [0, T ].
The interpretation of (20) is that the variation and hence evaluation (of team optimality) is
done by the central layer and it is this layer alone that can determine if the decision for the
i-th player is optimal or not. Even for Problem 2 the authors of this paper are not aware of any
publication which addresses necessary and/or sufficient conditions of optimality. Conditions (20)
are analogous to the Nash equilibrium strategies of team games consisting of a single pay-off
and N DM. The person-by-person optimal strategy states that none of the N members (possibly
with different information structures) can deviate unilaterally from the optimal strategy and gain
by doing so. The rationale for the restriction to person-by-person optimal strategy is based on
the fact that the actions of the N DM are not communicated to each other, and hence they cannot
do better than restricting attention to this optimal strategy.
Problems 1, 2 using relaxed strategies are the main problems addressed in this paper, while
conclusions for regular strategies are drawn from these results. Clearly, any strategy which is
optimal for Problem 1 is also a person-by-person optimal and hence optimal for Problem 2.
III. EXISTENCE OF TEAM OPTIMAL STRATEGIES
As mentioned earlier, not every control problem admits optimal regular strategies. However,
in many problems relaxed strategies exist under certain mild assumptions. In this section we use
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a similar procedure as the one developed in [36] for centralized information structures to prove
(i) existence of solution of the distributed stochastic dynamical decision system (12), and (ii)
existence of optimal relaxed strategies for the Problem 1.
A generalized sequence ui,α ∈ Uirel[0, T ] is said to converge (in the weak∗ topology or) vaguely
to ui,o, written ui,α v−→ ui,o, if and only if for every ϕ ∈ L1
Gi
T
([0, T ], C(Ai))
E
∫
[0,T ]×Ai
ϕt(ξ)u
i,α
t (dξ)dt −→ E
∫
[0,T ]×Ai
ϕt(ξ)u
i,o
t (dξ)dt as α→∞, ∀i ∈ ZN .
With respect to the vague (weak∗) topology the set Uirel[0, T ] is compact, and from here on we
assume that Uirel[0, T ], ∀i ∈ ZN has been endowed with this vague topology.
Let B∞
FT
([0, T ], L2(Ω,Rn)) denote the space of FT -adapted Rn valued second order random
processes endowed with the norm topology ‖ · ‖ defined by
‖ x ‖2
△
= sup
t∈[0,T ]
E|x(t)|2
Rn
.
To study the question of existence of solution to (12) we use the following assumptions.
Assumptions 1. The drift f and diffusion coefficients σ associated with (12) are defined by the
Borel measurable maps:
f : [0, T ]× Rn × A(N) −→ Rn, σ : [0, T ]× Rn × A(N) −→ L(Rm,Rn)
and they are continuous in the last two arguments and assumed to satisfy the following basic
properties:.
(A0) (Ai, d), ∀i ∈ ZN are compact.
There exists a K ∈ L2,+([0, T ],R) such that
(A1) |f(t, x, ξ)− f(t, y, ξ)|Rn ≤ K(t)|x− y|Rn uniformly in ξ ∈ A(N);
(A2) |f(t, x, ξ)|Rn ≤ K(t)(1 + |x|Rn) uniformly in ξ ∈ A(N)
(A3) |σ(t, x, ξ)− σ(t, y, ξ)|L(Rm,Rn) ≤ K(t)|x− y|Rn uniformly in ξ ∈ A(N);
(A4) |σ(t, x, ξ)|L(Rm,Rn) ≤ K(t)(1 + |x|Rn) uniformly in ξ ∈ A(N);
(A5) f(t, x, ·), σ(t, x, ·) are continuous in ξ ∈ A(N), ∀(t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× Rn.
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Assumptions 1, (A1)-(A4) are the so-called Itoˆ conditions for existence and uniqueness of strong
solutions (having continuous sample paths) [8].
The following lemma proves the existence of solutions and their continuous dependence on the
decision variables.
Lemma 1. Suppose Assumptions 1 hold. Then for any F0,0-measurable initial state x0 having
finite second moment, and any u ∈ U(N)rel [0, T ], the following hold.
(1) System (12) has a unique solution x ∈ B∞
FT
([0, T ], L2(Ω,Rn)) having a continuous
modification, that is, x ∈ C([0, T ],Rn), P−a.s, ∀i ∈ ZN .
(2) The solution of system (12) is continuously dependent on the control, in the sense that,
as ui,α
v
−→ ui,o in Uirel[0, T ], ∀i ∈ ZN , xα
s
−→ xo in B∞
FT
([0, T ], L2(Ω,Rn)), ∀i ∈ ZN .
These statements also hold for feedback strategies u ∈ U(N),zurel [0, T ].
Proof: Since the class of policies Uirel[0, T ], ∀i ∈ ZN is compact in the vague topology, then
×Ni=1U
i
rel[0, T ] is also compact in this topology. Utilizing this observation the proof is identical
to that of [36], Lemma 3.1.
Using the results of Lemma 1 in the next theorem we establish existence of a minimizer uo ∈
U
(N)
rel [0, T ] for Problem 1. We need the following assumptions.
Assumptions 2. The functions ℓ and ϕ associated with the pay-off (14) are Borel measurable
maps:
ℓ : [0, T ]× Rn × A(N) −→ (−∞,+∞], ϕ : Rn −→ (−∞,+∞].
satisfying the following basic conditions:
(B1) x −→ ℓ(t, x, ξ) is continuous on Rn for each t ∈ [0, T ], uniformly with respect to
ξ ∈ A(N);
(B2) ∃ h ∈ L+1 ([0, T ],R) such that for each t ∈ [0, T ], |ℓ(t, x, ξ)| ≤ h(t)(1 + |x|2Rn);
(B3) x −→ ϕ(x) is lower semicontinuous on Rn and ∃ c0, c1 ≥ 0 such that |ϕ(x)| ≤
c0 + c1|x|
2
Rn
.
Now we present the following existence theorem [36].
June 16, 2018 DRAFT
17
Theorem 1. (Existence of Team Optimal Strategies) Consider Problem 1 and suppose Assump-
tions 1 and 2 hold. Then there exists a team decision uo △= (u1,o, u2,o, . . . , uN,o) ∈ U(N)rel [0, T ] at
which J(u1, u2, . . . , uN) attains its infimum. Existence also holds for uo ∈ U(N),zurel [0, T ].
Proof: Since the class of control policies UNrel[0, T ] is compact in the vague topology, it
suffices to prove that J(·) is lower semicontinuous with respect to this topology. This follows
precisely from the same procedure as in [36], Theorem 3.2.
We conclude this section by stating that existence of team optimal strategies utilizing decen-
tralized information structures follows directly from analogous results of centralized stochastic
control strategies [13].
IV. OPTIMALITY CONDITIONS FOR RELAXED STRATEGIES
In this section we present the necessary and sufficient conditions of optimality for the team
game of Problem 1. The derivation of stochastic minimum principle (necessary conditions of op-
timality) or stochastic Pontryagin’s minimum principle is based on the martingale representation
approach. For this reason we shall fisrt state certain fundamental properties of semi martingales,
which are used in the derivation.
Definition 1. Let FT denote a complete filtration generated by an Rm−dimensional Brownian
motion process {W (t) : t ∈ [0, T ]}. An Rn−valued random process {m(t) : t ∈ [0, T ]} is said
to be a square integrable continuous FT−semi martingale if and only if it has a representation
m(t) = m(0) +
∫ t
0
v(s)ds+
∫ t
0
Σ(s)dW (s), t ∈ [0, T ], (21)
for some v ∈ L2
FT
([0, T ],Rn) and Σ ∈ L2
FT
([0, T ],L(Rm,Rn)) and for some Rn−valued F0,0−measurable
random variable m(0) having finite second moment. The set of all such semi martingales is
denoted by SM2[0, T ].
We need the following class of FT−semi martingales:
SM20[0, T ]
△
=
{
m ∈ SM2[0, T ] : m(t) =
∫ t
0
v(s)ds+
∫ t
0
Σ(s)dW (s), t ∈ [0, T ],
for v ∈ L2FT ([0, T ],R
n) and Σ ∈ L2FT ([0, T ],L(R
m,Rn))
}
. (22)
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Now we present a fundamental result which is used in the derivation of minimum principle.
Theorem 2. (Semi martingale Representation) The class of semi martingales SM20[0, T ] is a
real linear vector space and it is a Hilbert space with respect to the norm topology ‖ m ‖SM20[0,T ]
given by
‖ m ‖SM20[0,T ]
△
=
(
E
∫
[0,T ]
|v(t)|2
Rn
dt+ E
∫
[0,T ]
tr(Σ∗(t)Σ(t))dt
)1/2
.
Moreover, the space SM20[0, T ] is isometrically isomorphic to the space
L2
FT
([0, T ],Rn)× L2
FT
([0, T ],L(Rm,Rn)).
Proof: For proof see Theorem 4.3 in [36].
For the derivation of stochastic minimum principle of optimality we shall require stronger
regularity conditions for the drift and diffusion coefficients {b, σ}, as well as, for the running
and terminal pay-offs functions {ℓ, ϕ}. These are given below.
Assumptions 3. E|x(0)|2
Rn
<∞ and the maps of {f, σ, ℓ, ϕ} satisfy the following conditions.
(C1) The triple {f, σ, ℓ} are measurable in t ∈ [0, T ];
(C2) The quadruple {f, σ, ℓ, ϕ} are once continuously differentiable with respect to the state
variable x ∈ Rn;
(C3) The first derivatives of {f, σ} with respect to the state are bounded uniformly on
[0, T ]× Rn × A(N).
Consider the Gateaux derivative of σ with respect to the variable at the point (t, z, ν) ∈ [0, T ]×
R
n ×Ni=1 M1(A
i) in the direction η ∈ Rn defined by
σx(t, z, ν; η)
△
= lim
ε→0
1
ε
{
σ(t, z + εη, ν)− σ(t, z, ν)
}
, t ∈ [0, T ].
Note that the map η −→ σx(t, z, ν; η) is linear, and it follows from Assumptions 3, (C3) that
there exists a finite positive number β > 0 such that
|σx(t, z, ν; η)|L(Rm,Rn) ≤ β|η|Rn, t ∈ [0, T ].
In order to present the necessary conditions of optimality we need the so called variational
equation. Let us first introduce the variational equation for nonanticipative information struc-
tures. Suppose uo △= (u1,o, u2,o, . . . , uN,o) ∈ U(N)rel [0, T ] denotes the optimal decision and u
△
=
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(u1, u2, . . . , uN) ∈ U
(N)
rel [0, T ] any other decision. Since Uirel[0, T ] is convex ∀i ∈ ZN , it is clear
that for any ε ∈ [0, 1],
ui,εt
△
= ui,ot + ε(u
i
t − u
i,o
t ) ∈ U
i
rel[0, T ], ∀i ∈ ZN .
Let xε(·) ≡ xε(·; uε(·)) and xo(·) ≡ xo(·; uo(·)) ∈ B∞
FT
([0, T ], L2(Ω,Rn)) denote the solutions of
the system equation (12) corresponding to uε(·) and uo(·), respectively. Consider the limit
Z(t)
△
= lim
ε↓0
1
ε
{
xε(t)− xo(t)
}
, t ∈ [0, T ].
We have the following result characterizing the process {Z(t) : t ∈ [0, T ]}.
Lemma 2. Suppose Assumptions 3 hold and consider nonanticipative strategies U(N)rel [0, T ]. The
process {Z(t) : t ∈ [0, T ]} as defined above is an element of the Banach space
B∞
FT
([0, T ], L2(Ω,Rn)) and it is the unique solution of the variational stochastic differential
equation
dZ(t) = fx(t, x
o(t), uot )Z(t)dt+ σx(t, x
o(t), uot ;Z(t)) dW (t)
+
N∑
i=1
f(t, xo(t), u−i,o, uit − u
i,o
t )dt+
N∑
i=1
σ(t, xo(t), u−i,ot , u
i
t − u
i,o
t )dW (t), Z(0) = 0.
(23)
having a continuous modification.
Proof: We closely follow the steps in [33]. Writing the system (12) as an integral equation
with solutions xε, xo corresponding to controls uε, uo respectively and taking the difference
xε(t)−xo(t) and dividing by ε and then letting ε −→ 0, it can be shown that it converges for all
t ∈ [0, T ],P−a.s. to the solution of system (23). Note that the system (23) is a linear stochastic
differential equation in Z with non homogeneous terms given by the sum of the last two terms.
Let {z(t) : t ∈ [0, T ]} denote the solution of its homogenous part given by
dz(t) = fx(t, x
o(t), uot )z(t)dt+ σx(t, x
o(t), ui,ot ; z(t))dW (t), z(s) = ζ, t ∈ [s, T ]. (24)
By Assumptions 3 and Lemma 1 this system has a unique solution {z(t) : t ∈ [s, T ]} given by
z(t) = Ψ(t, s)ζ, t ∈ [s, T ],
where Ψ(t, s), t ∈ [s, T ] is the random (FT−adapted) transition operator for the homogenous
system. Since the derivatives of f and σ with respect to the state are uniformly bounded, the
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transition operator Ψ(t, s), t ∈ [s, T ] is uniformly P−a.s. bounded (with values in the space of
n× n matrices).
By Using the random transition operator Ψ we can write the solution of the non homogenous
stochastic differential equation (23) as follows,
Z(t) =
∫ t
0
Ψ(t, s)dη(s), t ∈ [0, T ], (25)
where {η(t) : t ∈ [0, T ]} is the semi martingale given by the following Ito differential,
dη(t) =
N∑
i=1
f(t, xo(t), u−i,o, uit − u
i,o
t )dt
+
N∑
i=1
σ(t, xo(t), u−i,o, uit − u
i,o
t ) dW (t), η(0) = 0, t ∈ (0, T ]. (26)
Note that {η(t) : t ∈ [0, T ]} is a continuous square integrable FT−adapted semi martingale.
The fact that it has continuous modification follows directly from the representation (25) and
the continuity of the semi martingale {η(t) : t ∈ [0, T ]}.
Clearly, the variational equation for nonanticipative strategies U(N)rel [0, T ] is obtained as in
centralized control strategies found in [36]. Next, we discuss the variational equation for feedback
information structures. For u ∈ U(N),z
u
rel [0, T ] the variational equation will also involve derivatives
of u with respect to the state trajectory x, since such strategies utilize feedback. To avoid this
technicality, we first address the question as to whether optimizing J(u) over nonanticipative
information structures is the same as optimizing J(u) over feedback information structures. If
this is the case then the variational equation for u ∈ U(N),z
u
rel [0, T ] will be that of u ∈ U
(N)
rel [0, T ].
We shall require the following assumption.
Assumptions 4. The following holds.
(E1) The diffusion coefficient σ is independent of u and both σ(·, ·) and σ−1(·, ·) are uni-
formly bounded.
Under the (additional) Assumptions 4 we can prove the following theorem.
Theorem 3. Consider Problem 1 and suppose Assumptions 1 and 4 hold. Define the σ−algebras
F
x(0),W
0,t
△
= σ{x(0),W (s) : 0 ≤ s ≤ t}, Fx
u
0,t
△
= σ{xu(s) : 0 ≤ s ≤ t}, ∀t ∈ [0, T ].
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Then for all u ∈ U(N),xurel [0, T ] the two σ-algebras are equivalent written as an equality, Fx(0),W0,t =
Fx
u
0,t , ∀t ∈ [0, T ].
Proof: Clearly, by Lemma 1, we have Fxu0,t ⊂ Fx(0),W0,t , ∀u ∈ U(N)rel [0, T ], t ∈ [0, T ]. By use
of Assumptions 4 one can easily verify that Fx(0),W0,t ⊂ Fx
u
0,t , ∀t ∈ [0, T ]. This completes the
proof.
Under the conditions of Theorem 3, for any stochastic kernel {uit(Γ) ≡ qit(Γ|Gx
i,u
0,t ) : t ∈
[0, T ]} ∈ Ux
i,u
rel [0, T ],Γ ∈ B(A
i) which is Gxi,u0,t −measurable there exists a function φi(·) adapted
to a sub-σ−algebra of F i0,t ⊂ F
x(0),W
0,t such that uit(Γ) = qit(Γ|φi(t, x(0),W (·
∧
t, ω))),P −
a.s, ∀t ∈ [0, T ], i = 1, . . . N .
Let F iT
△
= {F i0,t : t ∈ [0, T ]},G
xi,u
T
△
= {Gx
i,u
0,t : t ∈ [0, T ]}, i = 1, . . . ,ZN , and define all such
adapted nonanticipative functions by
U
i
rel[0, T ]
△
=
{
u ∈ L∞
F i
T
([0, T ],M1(A
i)) : ui ∈ L∞
Gx
i,u
T
([0, T ],M1(A
i))
}
, ∀i ∈ ZN . (27)
Next, we introduce the following additional assumptions.
Assumptions 5. The following holds.
(E2) Uxi,urel [0, T ] is dense in U
i
rel[0, T ], ∀i ∈ ZN .
Under the additional Assumptions 5 we can prove the following result.
Theorem 4. Consider Problem 1 with control strategies from U(N),xurel [0, T ]. Under Assumptions 1,
2, 5, and |ϕx(x) + ℓx(t, x, u)|Rn ≤ K(1 + |x|Rn) we have,
inf
u∈×Ni=1U
i
rel[0,T ]
J(u) = inf
u∈×Ni=1U
zi,u
rel
[0,T ]
J(u). (28)
Proof: The assertion is obvious because of the density assumption (E2) and the continuity
of J in the vague topology.
The point to be made regarding Theorem 4 is that if u ∈ U(N),x
u
rel [0, T ] achieves the infimum
of J(u) then it is also optimal with respect to U(N)rel [0, T ]
△
= ×Ni=1U
i
rel[0, T ]. Consequently, the
necessary conditions for feedback information structures u ∈ U(N),x
u
rel [0, T ] to be optimal are
those for which nonanticipative information structures u ∈ U(N)rel [0, T ] are optimal.
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In the next remark we give an example for which Assumptions 5 hold, and hence Theorem 4 is
valid.
Remark 1. Suppose x1 and x2 are governed by the following stochastic differential equations
dx1(t) =f 1(t, x1(t), u1(t))dt+ σ1(t, x1(t))dW 1(t), x1(0) = x10, (29)
dx2(t) =f 2(t, x1(t), x2(t), u1(t), u2(t))dt+ σ2(t, x1(t), x2(t))dW 2(t), x2(0) = x20, (30)
z1(t) =h1(t, x1(t)), z2(t) = h2(t, x1(t), x2(t)), t ∈ [0, T ], (31)
where h1, h2 are measurable, W 1(·),W 2(·) are independent, and u1 ∈ U1,z
1,u1
rel [0, T ], u
2 ∈
U
2,z2,u
2
rel [0, T ]. If we further assume that {σi(·, ·)} and their inverses are bounded, then we can
find Uirel[0, T ], i = 1, 2 for which (E2) holds, and thus Theorem 4 holds. The structure of the
stochastic dynamics (29), (30) can be generalized to more than two coupled systems.
Next, we introduce the following alternative theorem to Theorem 4, which does not employ
Assumptions 5.
Theorem 5. Consider Problem 1 with strategies from U(N),zurel [0, T ], under Assumptions 1, 2, III,
4 and |ϕx(x) + ℓx(t, x, u)|Rn ≤ K(1 + |x|Rn).
Then Uzi,urel [0, T ] is dense in U
i
rel[0, T ], ∀i ∈ ZN and
inf
u∈×Ni=1U
i
rel[0,T ]
J(u) = inf
u∈×Ni=1U
zi,u
rel
[0,T ]
J(u). (32)
Proof: The derivation is based on [40] but extended to relaxed strategies. By Theorem 3,
for any ui ∈ Uzi,urel [0, T ] which is Gz
i,u
T −adapted we can define the set U
i
rel[0, T ], i = 1, . . . , N
via (27). For any u ∈ U(N)rel [0, T ] △= ×Ni=1U
i
rel[0, T ], k =
T
M
, and any test function φ ∈ C(A(N)),
define
uk,t[φ]
△
=


∫
A(N)
φ(ξ)u0(dξ) for 0 ≤ t < k u0 ∈ A(N)
1
k
∫ nk
(n−1)k
∫
A(N)
φ(ξ)us(dξ)ds for nk ≤ t < (n+ 1)k, n = 1, . . . ,M − 1.
(33)
Clearly uk ∈ U
(N)
rel [0, T ], and uk −→ u in L∞FT ([0, T ],M1(A
(N))) in the weak star sense. We
need to show that uk ∈ U(N),z
uk [0, T ]. Let xk denote the trajectory corresponding to uk, and
F
xu
k
0,t the σ−algebra generated by {xk(s) : 0 ≤ s ≤ t}. Define
Ik(t)
△
=
∫ t
0
σ(s, xk(s))dW (t) = xk(t)− x(0)−
∫ t
0
f(s, xk(s), uk(s))ds, (34)
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and
W (t) =
∫ t
0
σ(s, xk(s))
−1dIk(s). (35)
Since uk ∈ U
(N)
rel [0, T ], the process Ik(t) is F
xu
k
0,t−measurable, for 0 ≤ t < k. Hence,
F
x(0),W
0,t = F
xu
k
0,t , 0 ≤ t ≤ k. (36)
Therefore, uk,t is F
xu
k
0,t− measurable for k ≤ t ≤ 2k. From the above equations it follows that
(36) also holds for k ≤ t ≤ 2k, and by induction that Fx(0),W0,t = Fx
u
k
0,t , ∀t ∈ [0, T ]. Therefore,
uik,t is also (weak star) measurable with respect to Fx
u
k
0,t . Hence , for any uit which is (weak star)
measurable with respect to a nonanticipative functional zi = hi(t, x) there exists a nonanticipative
functional of {x(0),W} which realizes it. By Theorem 4 the derivation is complete.
.
Before we prove the optimality conditions we define the Hamiltonian system of equations.
The Hamiltonian is a real valued function
H : [0, T ]× Rn × Rn × L(Rm,Rn)×M1(A
(N)) −→ R
given by
H(t, ξ, ζ,M, ν)
△
= 〈f(t, ξ, ν), ζ〉+ tr(M∗σ(t, ξ, ν)) + ℓ(t, ξ, ν), t ∈ [0, T ]. (37)
For any u ∈ U(N)rel [0, T ], the adjoint process is (ψ,Q) ∈ L2FT ([0, T ],Rn)×L2FT ([0, T ],L(Rm,Rn))
satisfies the following backward stochastic differential equation
dψ(t) = −f ∗x(t, x(t), ut)ψ(t)dt− VQ(t)dt− ℓx(t, x(t), ut)dt+Q(t)dW (t), t ∈ [0, T ),
= −Hx(t, x(t), ψ(t), Q(t), ut)dt+Q(t)dW (t), (38)
ψ(T ) = ϕx(x(T )) (39)
where VQ ∈ L2FT ([0, T ],R
n) is given by 〈VQ(t), ζ〉 = tr(Q∗(t)σx(t, x(t), ut; ζ)), t ∈ [0, T ] (e.g.,
VQ(t) =
∑m
k=1
(
σ
(k)
x (t, x(t), ut)
)∗
Q(k)(t), t ∈ [0, T ], σ(k) is the kth column of σ, σ(k)x is the
derivative of σ(k) with respect to the state, for k = 1, 2, . . . , m, Q(k) is the kth column of Q).
In terms of the Hamiltonian, the state process satisfies the stochastic differential equation
dx(t) = f(t, x(t), ut)dt+ σ(t, x(t), ut)dW (t), t ∈ (0, T ],
= Hψ(t, x(t), ψ(t), Q(t), ut)dt+ σ(t, x(t), ut)dW (t), (40)
x(0) = x0 (41)
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A. Necessary Conditions of Optimality
In this section we state and prove the necessary conditions for team optimality. Specifically,
given that uo ∈ U(N)rel [0, T ] or uo ∈ U
(N),zu
rel [0, T ] is team optimal, we show that it leads naturally
to the Hamiltonian system of equations (called necessary conditions). The derivation is based
on the semi martingale representation as in [36] with some modifications necessary to admit
decentralized strategies adapted to an arbitrary filtration.
In the following theorem we present the necessary conditions of optimality for Problem 1.
Theorem 6. (Necessary conditions for team optimality) Consider Problem 1 under Assump-
tions 2, 3.
(I) Suppose FT = σ{x(0),W (t), t ∈ [0, T ]} and U(N)rel [0, T ] is the class of relaxed controls
adapted to this filtration. For an element uo ∈ U(N)rel [0, T ] with the corresponding
solution xo ∈ B∞
FT
([0, T ], L2(Ω,Rn)) to be team optimal, it is necessary that the
following conditions hold.
(1) There exists a semi martingale mo ∈ SM20[0, T ] with the intensity process
(ψo, Qo) ∈ L2
FT
([0, T ],Rn)× L2
FT
([0, T ],L(Rm,Rn)).
(2) The processes {uo, xo, ψo, Qo} satisfy the inequality :
N∑
i=1
E
∫ T
0
H(t, xo(t)ψo(t), Qo(t), u−i,ot , u
i
t − u
i,o
t )dt ≥ 0, ∀u ∈ U
(N)
rel [0, T ].
(42)
(3) The process (ψo, Qo) is the unique solution of the backward stochastic differ-
ential equation (38), (39) and that, for Gi0,t ⊂ F0,t, the control uo ∈ U(N)rel [0, T ]
satisfies the point wise almost sure inequalities.
E
{
H(t, xo(t), ψ0(t), Qo(t), u−i,ot , ν
i)|Gi0,t
}
≥ E
{
H(t, xo(t), ψo(t), Qo(t), uot )|G
i
0,t
}
,
∀νi ∈M1(A
i), a.e.t ∈ [0, T ],P|Gi0,t − a.s., i = 1, 2, . . . , N. (43)
(II) Suppose FT is as above, and the Assumption 5 holds. For an element uo ∈ U(N),z
u
rel [0, T ]
with the corresponding solution xo ∈ B∞
FT
([0, T ], L2(Ω,Rn)) to be team optimal, it is
necessary that the statements of Part (I) hold with Gi0,t replaced by Gzi,u0,t , ∀t ∈ [0, T ].
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Proof: The derivation of (1), (2) follows closely the basic steps of centralized strategies in
[36], from which the derivation of team necessary conditions of optimality (3) are established.
(I). (1) Suppose uo ∈ U(N)rel [0, T ] is an optimal team decision and u ∈ U(N)rel [0, T ] any other
admissible decision. Since Uirel[0, T ] is convex ∀i ∈ ZN , we have, for any ε ∈ [0, 1], u
i,ε
t
△
=
ui,ot + ε(u
i
t − u
i,o
t ) ∈ U
i
rel[0, T ], ∀i ∈ ZN . Let xε(·) ≡ xε(·; uε(·)), xo(·) ≡ xo(·; uo(·)) ∈
B∞
FT
([0, T ], L2(Ω,Rn)) denote the solutions of the system (12) and (41) corresponding to uε(·)
and uo(·), respectively. Since uo(·) ∈ U(N)rel [0, T ] is optimal it is clear that
J(uε)− J(uo) ≥ 0, ∀ε ∈ [0, 1], ∀u ∈ U
(N)
rel [0, T ]. (44)
Define the Gateaux differential of J at uo in the direction u− uo by
dJ(uo, u− u0)
△
= lim
ε↓0
J(uε)− J(uo)
ε
≡
d
dε
J(uε)|ε=0.
Dividing the expression (44) by ε and letting ε ↓ 0 we obtain
dJ(uo, u− u0) = L(Z) +
N∑
i=1
E
∫ T
0
ℓ(t, xo(t), u−i,o, uit − u
i,o
t )dt ≥ 0, ∀u ∈ U
(N)
rel [0, T ], (45)
where L(Z) is given by the functional
L(Z) = E
{∫ T
0
〈ℓx(t, x
o(t), uot ), Z(t)〉 dt+ 〈ϕx(x
o(T )), Z(T )〉
}
. (46)
Since by Lemma 2, the process Z(·) ∈ B∞
FT
([0, T ], L2(Ω,Rn)) and it is also continuous P−a.s
it follows from Assumptions 2, (B2), and Assumptions 3, that Z −→ L(Z) is a continuous
linear functional. Further, by Lemma 2, η −→ Z is a continuous linear map from the Hilbert
space SM20[0, T ] to the B-space B∞FT ([0, T ], L
2(Ω,Rn)) given by the expression (25). Thus the
composition map η −→ Z −→ L(Z) ≡ L˜(η) is a continuous linear functional on SM20[0, T ].
Then by virtue of Riesz representation theorem for Hilbert spaces, there exists a semi martingale
mo ∈ SM20[0, T ] with intensity (ψo, Qo) ∈ L2FT ([0, T ],R
n)× L2
FT
([0, T ],L(Rm,Rn)) such that
L(Z)
△
= L˜(η) = (mo, η)SM20[0,T ] =
N∑
i=1
E
∫ T
0
〈ψo(t), f(t, xo(t), u−i,o, uit − u
i,o
t )〉dt
+
N∑
i=1
E
∫ T
0
tr(Qo,∗(t)σ(t, xo(t), u−i,o, uit − u
i,o
t ))dt. (47)
This proves (1).
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(2) Substituting (47) into (45) we obtain the following variational equation.
dJ(uo, u− u0) =
N∑
i=1
E
∫ T
0
〈ψo(t), f(t, xo(t), u−i,o, uit − u
i,o
t )〉dt
+
N∑
i=1
E
∫ T
0
tr(Qo,∗(t)σ(t, xo(t), u−i,o, uit − u
i,o
t ))dt
+
N∑
i=1
E
∫ T
0
ℓ(t, xo(t), u−i,o, uit − u
i,o
t )dt ≥ 0, ∀u ∈ U
(N)
rel [0, T ]. (48)
It follows from the definition of the Hamiltonian that the inequality (48) is precisely (42) along
with the pair {(ψo(t), Qo(t)) : t ∈ [0, T ]}. This completes the proof of (2).
(3) Next, we prove that the pair {(ψo(t), Qo(t)) : t ∈ [0, T ]}) is given by the solution of the
adjoint equations (38), (39). Computing the Itoˆ differential of the scalar product 〈Z, ψo〉 and
integrating this over [0, T ], it follows from the variational equation (23) that
E〈Z(T ), ψo(T )〉 =E
{∫ T
0
〈Z(t), f ∗x(t, x
o(t), uot )ψ
o(t)dt+ σ∗x(t, x
o, uot ;ψ
o)dW (t) + dψo(t)〉
+
N∑
i=1
∫ T
0
〈f(t, xo(t), u−i,ot , u
i
t − u
i,o
t ), ψ
o(t)〉dt
+
N∑
i=1
∫ T
0
〈σ∗(t, xo(t), u−i,o, uit − u
i,o
t )ψ
o(t), dW (t)〉+
∫ T
0
< dZ, dψo > (t)
}
(49)
= E
{∫ T
0
〈Z(t), f ∗x(t, x
o(t), uot )ψ
o(t)dt+ dψo(t)〉
+
N∑
i=1
∫ T
0
〈f(t, xo(t), u−i,o, uit − u
i,o
t ), ψ
o(t)〉dt
∫ T
0
< dZ, dψo > (t)
}
, (50)
where the last bracket < ·, · > in each of the above expressions is the quadratic variation between
the two processes, and the stochastic integrals in (49) have zero expectation giving (50). Since Itoˆ
derivatives of the variation process {Z(t) : t ∈ [0, T ]} and the adjoint process {ψo(t) : t ∈ [0, T ]}
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have the form
dZ(t) = bounded variation terms + σx(t, xo(t), uot ;Z(t))dW (t)
+
N∑
i=1
σ(t, xo(t), u−i,ot , u
i
t − u
i,o
t )dW (t), Z(0) = 0, t ∈ (0, T ], (51)
dψo(t) = bounded variation terms +Qo(t)dW (t), ψo(T ) = ϕx(xo(T )), (52)
their quadratic variation is given by
E
∫ T
0
< dZ, dψo > (t) =E
{∫ T
0
tr(Qo,∗σx(t, x
o(t), uot ;Z(t)))dt
}
+
N∑
i=1
E
{∫ T
0
tr(Qo,∗(t)σ(t, xo(t), u−i,ot , u
i
t − u
i,o
t ))dt
}
. (53)
The first term on the right hand side of the above expression is linear in Z, hence there exists
a process {VQo(t) : t ∈ [0, T ]}, given by the following expression
〈VQo(t), Z(t)〉
△
= tr(Qo,∗(t)σx(t, x
o(t), uot ;Z(t))). (54)
By Assumptions 3, σ has uniformly bounded spatial first derivative and it follows from the semi
martingale representation that Qo ∈ L2
FT
([0, T ],L(Rm,Rn)) and hence VQo ∈ L2FT ([0, T ],R
n).
Substituting (54) into (53) and (53) into (50), we obtain
E(Z(T ), ψo(T )) = E
{∫ T
0
〈Z(t), f ∗x(t, x
o(t), uot )ψ
odt+ VQo(t)dt−Q
o(t)dW (t) + dψo(t)〉
}
+
N∑
i=1
E
{∫ T
0
〈f(t, xo(t), u−i,ot , u
i
t − u
i,o
t ), ψ
o(t)〉dt
+ tr(Qo,∗(t)σ(t, xo(t), u−i,ot , u
i
t − u
i,o
t ))dt
}
. (55)
Thus, by setting
dψo(t) = −f ∗x(t, x
o(t), uot )ψ
o(t)dt− VQo(t)dt+Q
o(t)dW (t)− ℓx(t, x
o(t), uot )dt, t ∈ [0, T )
(56)
ψo(T ) = ϕx(x
o(T )), (57)
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it follows from (55) and the expression for the functional L(·) given by (46) that
L(Z) = E
{
〈Z(T ), ψo(T )〉+
∫ T
0
〈Z(t), ℓx(t, x
o(t), uot )〉dt
}
=
N∑
i=1
E
{∫ T
0
〈f(t, xo(t), u−i,ot , u
i
t − u
i,o
t ), ψ
o(t)〉+ tr(Qo,∗σ(t, xo(t), u−i,ot , u
i
t − u
i,o
t ))dt
}
.
(58)
Substituting (58) into (45) we again obtain (42), as expected. This is precisely what was obtained
by the semi martingale argument giving (47). Thus the pair {(ψo(t), Qo(t)) : t ∈ [0, T ]} must
satisfy the backward stochastic differential equation (56), (57), which is precisely the adjoint
equation given by (38), (39). Since ψo satisfies the stochastic differential equation and T is
finite, it follows from the classical theory of Itoˆ differential equations that ψo is actually an
element of B∞
FT
([0, T ], L2(Ω,Rn)) ⊂ L2
FT
([0, T ],Rn). In other words, ψo is more regular than
predicted by semi martingale theory. Hence, by our Assumptions on σ it is easy to verify that
σ∗x(t, x
o(t), uot ;ψ
o(t)) ∈ L2
FT
([0, T ],L(Rm,Rn)) and
σ∗(t, xo(t), u−i,ot , u
i
t − u
i,o
t )ψ
o(t) ∈ L2
FT
([0, T ],Rn), i = 1, . . . , N.
This proves the first part of (3).
Now we show (43). Write (42) in terms of the Hamiltonian as follows.
N∑
i=1
E
{∫ T
0
H(t, xo(t), ψo(t), Qo(t), u−i,ot , u
i
t − u
i,o
t )dt
}
≥ 0, ∀u ∈ U
(N)
rel [0, T ], (59)
where the triple {xo, ψo, Qo} is the unique solution of the Hamiltonian system (38), (39), (40),
(41). By using the property of conditional expectation then
N∑
i=1
E
{∫ T
0
E
{
H(t, xo(t), ψo(t), Qo(t), u−i,ot , u
i
t − u
i,o
t )|G
i
0,t
}
dt
}
≥ 0, ∀u ∈ U
(N)
rel [0, T ]. (60)
Let t ∈ (0, T ), ω ∈ Ω and ε > 0, and consider the sets I iε ≡ [t, t+ε] ⊂ [0, T ] and Ωiε(⊂ Ω) ∈ Gi0,t
containing ω such that |I iε| → 0 and P(Ωiε)→ 0 as ε→ 0, for i = 1, 2, . . . , N . For any sub-sigma
algebra G ⊂ F, let P|G denote the restriction of the probability measure P on to the σ-algebra
G. For any (vaguely) Gi0,t−adapted νi ∈M1(Ai), construct
uit =


νi for (t, ω) ∈ I iε × Ωiε
ui,ot otherwise
i = 1, 2, . . . , N. (61)
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Clearly, it follows from the above construction that ui ∈ Uirel[0, T ]. Substituting (61) in (60) we
obtain the following inequality
N∑
i=1
∫
Ωiε×I
i
ε
E
{
H(t, xo(t), ψo(t),Qo(t), u−i,ot , ν
i − ui,ot )|G
i
0,t
}
dt ≥ 0,
∀νi ∈ M1(A
i), a.e.t ∈ [0, T ],P|Gi0,t − a.s., i = 1, 2, . . . , N.
(62)
Letting |I iε| denote the Lebesgue measure of the set I iε and dividing the above expression by the
product measure P(Ωiε)|I iε| and letting ε→ 0 we arrive at the following inequality.
N∑
i=1
E
{
H(t, xo(t), ψo(t), Qo(t), u−i,ot , ν
i)|Gi0,t
}
≥
N∑
i=1
E
{
H(t, xo(t), ψo(t), Qo(t), u−i,ot , u
i,o
t )|G
i
0,t
}
,
∀νi ∈M1(A
i), a.e.t ∈ [0, T ],P|Gi0,t − a.s., i = 1, 2, . . . , N. (63)
To complete the proof of (3) define
gi(t, ω)
△
= E
{
H(t, xo(t), ψo(t), Qo(t), u−i,ot , ν
i − ui,ot )|G
i
0,t
}
, t ∈ [0, T ], ∀i ∈ ZN . (64)
We shall show that
gi(t, ω) ≥ 0, ∀νi ∈M1(A
i), a.e. t ∈ [0, T ], P|Gi0,t − a.s., ∀i ∈ ZN . (65)
Suppose for some i ∈ ZN , (65) does not hold, and let Ai △= {(t, ω) : gi(t, ω) < 0}. Since gi(t)
is Gi0,t−measurable ∀t ∈ [0, T ] we can choose ui in (63) as
uit
△
=


ν on Ai
ui,ot outside Ai
together with ujt = u
j,o
t , j 6= i, j ∈ ZN . Substituting this in (63) we arrive at
∫
Ai
gi(t, ω)dsdP ≥ 0,
which contradicts the definition of Ai, unless Ai has measure zero. Hence, (65) holds which is
precisely (43). This completes Part (I).
(II). By Theorem 4 the necessary conditions for team optimality satisfy those in Part (I) with
Gi0,t replaced by Gz
i,u
0,t .
The following remark helps identifying the martingale term in the adjoint process.
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Remark 2. The arguments in the derivation of Theorem 6 involving the Riesz representation
theorem for Hilbert space martingales, determine the martingale term of the adjoint process
Mt =
∫ t
0
ψox(s)σ(s, x
o(s), uos)dW (s), dual to the first martingale term in the variational equation
(23), provided ψx(·) exists (i.e., fxx, σxx, ℓxx, ϕxx exist and are uniformly bounded). Hence, Q
in the adjoint equation (38), is identified as Q(t) ≡ ψx(t)σ(t, x(t), ut). When the diffusion term
σ(·, ·, ·) is independent of x, given by σ(t, u), then since 〈VQ(t), ζ〉 = tr(Q∗(t)σx(t, x, ut; ζ)) we
have VQ(t) = 0, ∀t ∈ [0, T ] (e,g., the spatial derivative of the diffusion term is zero).
It is interesting to note that the necessary conditions, for a uo ∈ U(N)rel [0, T ] or uo ∈ U
(N),zu
rel [0, T ]
to be a person-by-person optimal policy, can be derived following similar steps as given in
Theorem 6, and that these necessary conditions are the same as the necessary conditions for the
team optimal strategy. This is stated as a Corollary.
Corollary 1. (Necessary conditions for person-by-person optimality) Consider Problem 2 under
Assumptions 2, 3. Under the conditions of Theorem 6, Part (I), for an element uo ∈ U(N)rel [0, T ]
with the corresponding solution xo ∈ B∞
FT
([0, T ], L2(Ω,Rn)) to be a person-by-person optimal
strategy, it is necessary that statements (1), (3) of Theorem 6, and Part I, with statement (2)
replaced by
E
∫ T
0
H(t, xo(t), ψo(t), Qo(t), u−i,ot , u
i
t − u
i,o
t )dt ≥ 0, ∀u
i ∈ Uirel[0, T ], ∀i ∈ ZN . (66)
hold. Similar conclusions hold for strategies U(N),zurel [0, T ].
Proof: Primarily, the derivation is based on the same procedure as that of Theorem 6. The
only difference is, that in this case, the variations of the DM policies are carried out in the
direction of individual members while the rest of the members carry optimal policy.
Clearly, every team optimal strategy for Problem 1 is a person-by-person optimal strategy for
Problem 2. Hence person-by-person optimality is weaker than team optimality. By comparing
the statements of Theorem 6 and Corollary 1, it is clear that statements (1) and (3) coincide,
while the only difference are the variational inequalities (42) and (66). However, (66) implies
(42), and it can be shown that (42) implies (66). Indeed, if (66) is violated for some j ∈ ZN
then by choosing all other ui = ui,o, ∀i ∈ ZN , i 6= j, the right side of (42) will be negative,
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which is a contradiction. This observation is new, and has not been documented in the static
team game literature [23].
Remark 3. From the above necessary conditions one can deduce the necessary conditions for
full centralized information and partial centralized information. We state these conditions below.
(1) Centralized Full Information Structures. Consider Problem 1 under the conditions of
Theorem 6, Part (I), and assume ui are adapted to FT , ∀i ∈ ZN . The necessary conditions are
given by the following point wise almost sure inequalities
H(t, xo(t), ψo(t), Qo(t), µ) ≥ H(t, xo(t), ψo(t), Qo(t), uot ),
∀µ ∈M1(A
(N)), a.e. t ∈ [0, T ], P− a.s., (67)
where {xo(t), ψo(t), Qo(t) : t ∈ [0, T ]} are the solutions of the Hamiltonian system (40), (41),
(38), (39). This corresponds to the classical case [8].
Moreover, if the strategies are based on centralized state feedback information, that is, ui are
adapted to the information GxuT , ∀i ∈ ZN , then under the conditions of Theorem 6, Part (II) the
previous optimality conditions are replaced by
E
{
H(t, xo(t), ψo(t), Qo(t), µ)|Gx
o
0,t
}
≥ E
{
H(t, xo(t), ψo(t), Qo(t), uot )|G
xo
0,t
}
,
∀µ ∈M1(A
(N)), a.e.t ∈ [0, T ],P|Gxo0,t − a.s. (68)
(2) Centralized Partial Information Structures. Consider Problem 1 under the conditions of
Theorem 6, Part (I) and Part (II) and suppose that each ui is adapted to the centralized partial
information GT ⊂ FT , and GzuT ⊂ Fxu0,T , respectively. Then the necessary condition is given by
E
{
H(t, xo(t), ψo(t), Qo(t), µ)|K0,t
}
≥ E
{
H(t, xo(t), ψ(t), Q(t), uot )|K0,t
}
,
∀µ ∈M1(A
(N)), a.e.t ∈ [0, T ],P|K0,t − a.s. (69)
where K0,t is a sub-sigma algebra of any of the sigma algebras indicated above.
Finally, we mention two important results derived in [36] which have direct extensions to
the current paper. The first addresses existence of measurable relaxed team optimal strategy
associated with the minimization of the Hamiltonian, and the second addresses existence of
realizable relaxed strategies by regular strategies.
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B. Sufficient Conditions of Optimality
In this section, we show that the necessary conditions of optimality (43) are also sufficient
under certain convexity conditions.
Theorem 7. (Sufficient conditions for team optimality) Consider Problem 1 and suppose As-
sumptions 2, 3 hold. Under the conditions of Theorem 6, Part (I), let (uo(·), xo(·)) denote any
control-state pair (decision-state) and let ψo(·) the corresponding adjoint processes.
Suppose the following conditions hold:
(C4) H(t, ·, ζ,M, ν), t ∈ [0, T ] is convex in ξ ∈ Rn;
(C5) ϕ(·) is convex in ξ ∈ Rn.
Then (uo(·), xo(·)) is team optimal if it satisfies (43). In other words, necessary conditions are
also sufficient. For feedback strategies U(N),zurel [0, T ] the same statement holds under the conditions
of Theorem 6, Part (II).
Proof: We shall prove the sufficiency under the conditions of Theorem 6, (I), that is, the
admissible strategies U(N)rel [0, T ], since the derivation is precisely the same for the case Part (II).
Let uo ∈ U(N)rel [0, T ] denote a candidate for the optimal team decision and u ∈ U
(N)
rel [0, T ] any
other decision. Then
J(uo)− J(u) = E
{∫ T
0
(
ℓ(t, xo(t), uot )− ℓ(t, x(t), ut)
)
dt+
(
ϕ(xo(T ))− ϕ(x(T ))
)}
. (70)
By the convexity of ϕ(·) then
ϕ(x(T ))− ϕ(xo(T )) ≥ 〈ϕx(x
o(T )), x(T )− xo(T )〉. (71)
Substituting (71) into (70) yields
J(uo)− J(u) ≤ E
{
〈ϕx(x
o(T )), xo(T )− x(T )〉
}
+E
{∫ T
0
(
ℓ(t, xo(t), uot )− ℓ(t, x(t), ut)
)
dt
}
. (72)
Applying the Ito differential rule to 〈ψo, x−xo〉 on the interval [0, T ] and then taking expecation
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we obtain the following equation.
E
{
〈ψo(T ), x(T )− xo(T )〉
}
= E
{
〈ψo(0), x(0)− xo(0)〉
}
+ E
{∫ T
0
〈−f ∗x(t, x
o(t), uot )ψ
o(t)dt− VQo(t)− ℓx(t, x
o(t), uot ), x(t)− x
o(t)〉dt
}
+ E
{∫ T
0
〈ψo(t), f(t, x(t), ut)− f(t, x
o(t), uot )〉dt
}
+ E
{∫ T
0
tr(Q∗,o(t)σ(t, x(t), ut)−Q
∗,o(t)σ(t, xo(t), uot ))dt
}
= −E
{∫ T
0
〈Hx(t, x
o(t), ψo(t), Qo(t), uot ), x(t)− x
o(t)〉dt
+ E
{∫ T
0
〈ψo(t), f(t, x(t), ut)− f(t, x
o(t), uot )〉dt
}
+ E
{∫ T
0
tr(Q∗,o(t)σ(t, x(t), ut)−Q
∗,o(t)σ(t, xo(t), uot ))dt
}
(73)
Note that ψo(T ) = ϕx(xo(T )). Substituting (73) into (72) we obtain
J(uo)− J(u) ≤E
{∫ T
0
[
H(t, xo(t), ψo(t), Qo(t), uot )−H(t, x(t), ψ
o(t), Qo(t), ut)
]
dt
}
−E
{∫ T
0
〈Hx(t, x
o(t), ψo(t), Qo(t), uot ), x
o(t)− x(t)〉dt
}
. (74)
Since by hypothesis H is convex in ξ ∈ Rn and linear in ν ∈ M1(A(N)), H is convex in both
(ξ, ν) ∈ Rn ×M1(A
(N)). Using this fact in (74) we readily obtain
J(uo)− J(u) ≤ E
∫ T
0
< H(t, xo(t), ψo(t), Qo(t), ·), uot (·)− ut(·) > dt ≤ 0, ∀u ∈ U
(N)
rel [0, T ],
(75)
where the last inequality follows from (43). This proves that uo optimal and hence the necessary
conditions are also sufficient.
Under conditions similar to those of Theorem 7, we can verify that a strategy is person-
by-person optimal for Problem 2 if it satisfies (43); this is stated as a corollary. Indeed, the
necessary conditions for team optimality and person-by-person optimality are equivalent, and
person-by-person optimality implies team optimality.
Theorem 8. (Sufficient conditions for person-by-person optimality) Consider Problem 2 and
suppose Assumptions 2, 3 hold. Under the conditions of Theorem 6, Part (I), let (uo(·), xo(·))
June 16, 2018 DRAFT
34
denote any control-state pair and let ψo(·) the corresponding adjoint processes.
Suppose the conditions of Theorem 7, (C4), (C5) hold.
Then (uo(·), xo(·)) is player-by-player optimal if it satisfies (43).
For feedback strategies U(N),zurel [0, T ] the above statements hold under the conditions of Theo-
rem 6, Part (II).
Proof: The proof is similar to that of Theorem 7.
V. OPTIMALITY CONDITIONS FOR REGULAR STRATEGIES
In the development of the necessary and sufficient conditions of optimality given in the
previous section we have given conditions which assert the existence of optimal decisions from
the class of relaxed decisions U(N)rel [0, T ] and U
(N),zu
rel [0, T ] in Theorem 1.
The main observation of this section is that, if optimal regular decisions exist from the admissible
class U(N)reg [0, T ] ⊂ U(N)rel [0, T ] (or the feedback class) then the necessary and sufficient conditions
of Theorem 6 and Theorem 7 can be specialized to the class of decision strategies which are
simply Dirac measures concentrated {uot : t ∈ [0, T ]} ∈ U
(N)
reg [0, T ] or U
(N),zu
reg [0, T ]. The important
advantage of the theory of relaxed controls is that the necessary conditions of optimality for
ordinary controls follow readily from those of relaxed controls without requiring differentiability
of the Hamiltonian or equivalently the drift and the diffusion coefficients f, σ with respect to
the control variables.
Thus we simply state the necessary and sufficient conditions of optimality for regular decentral-
ized decision strategies which follow as a corollary of Theorem 6, 7 by simply specializing to
regular decision strategies given by Dirac measures along the regular decision strategies leading
to the following Hamiltonian
H : [0, T ]× Rn × Rn ×L(Rm,Rn)× A(N) −→ R,
where
H(t, ξ, ζ,M, ν)
△
= 〈f(t, ξ, ν), ζ〉+ tr(M∗σ(t, ξ, ν)) + ℓ(t, ξ, ν), t ∈ [0, T ]. (76)
Theorem 9. (Regular team optimality conditions) Consider Problem 1 under the Assumptions
of Theorem 6 with decisions (or controls) from the regular class taking values in Ai, a closed,
bounded and convex subset of Rdi , ∀i ∈ ZN .
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(I) Let FT denote the filtration generated by x(0) and the Brownian motion W .
Necessary Conditions. For an element uo ∈ U(N)reg [0, T ] with the corresponding solution
xo ∈ B∞
FT
([0, T ], L2(Ω,Rn)) to be team optimal, it is necessary that the following hold.
(1) There exists a semi martingale mo ∈ SM20[0, T ] with the intensity process
(ψo, Qo) ∈ L2
FT
([0, T ],Rn)× L2
FT
([0, T ],L(Rm,Rn)).
(2) The variational inequality is satisfied:
N∑
i=1
E
{∫ T
0
(
H(t, xo(t), ψo(t), Qo(t), uit, u
−i,o
t )−H(t, x
o(t), ψo(t), Qo(t), uot )
)
dt
}
≥ 0,
∀u ∈ U(N)reg [0, T ]. (77)
(3) The process (ψo, Qo) ∈ L2
FT
([0, T ],Rn)× L2
FT
([0, T ],L(Rm,Rn)) is a unique
solution of the backward stochastic differential equation (38), (39), with H
replaced by H such that uo ∈ U(N)reg [0, T ] satisfies the point wise almost
sure inequalities with respect to the σ-algebras Gi0,t ⊂ F0,t, t ∈ [0, T ], i =
1, 2, . . . , N :
E
{(
H(t, xo(t),ψo(t), Qo(t), uit, u
−i,o
t )−H(t, x
o(t), ψo(t), Qo(t), uot )
)
|Gi0,t
}
≥ 0,
∀ui ∈ Ai, a.e.t ∈ [0, T ],P|Gi0,t − a.s., i = 1, 2, . . . , N. (78)
Sufficient Conditions. Let (uo(·), xo(·)) denote an admissible decision and
state pair and ψo(·) the corresponding adjoint processes.
Suppose the conditions (C4), (C5) holds and in addition
(C6) H(t, ξ, ζ,M, ·), t ∈ [0, T ], is convex in u ∈ A(N);
Then (xo(·), uo(·)) is optimal if it satisfies (78).
(II) Suppose FT is the filtration generated by x(0) and the Brownian motion W , and
Assumptions 5 hold with decision policies from the regular class. The necessary and
sufficient conditions for a feedback policy uo ∈ U(N),zureg [0, T ] to be optimal are given
by the statements under Part (I) with Gi0,t replaced by Gzi,u0,t , ∀t ∈ [0, T ].
Proof: Follows from Theorem 6, 7 by simply replacing relaxed controls by Dirac measures
concentrated at {uot : t ∈ [0, T ]} ∈ U
(N)
reg [0, T ] or U
(N),zu
reg [0, T ].
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Person-by-person optimality conditions for regular decision strategies follow from their relaxed
counterparts, as discussed above. Therefore we simply state the results as a corollary.
Corollary 2. (Person-by-person optimality) Consider Problem 2 under the conditions of The-
orem 9. Then the necessary and sufficient conditions of Theorem 9 hold with the variational
inequality (77) replaced by
E
{∫ T
0
(
H(t, xo(t), ψo(t), Qo(t), uit, u
−i,o
t )
−H(t, xo(t), ψo(t), Qo(t), ui,ot , u
−i,o
t )
)
dt
}
≥ 0, ∀ui ∈ Uireg[0, T ], ∀i ∈ ZN . (79)
Similar conclusions hold for strategies Uzi,ureg [0, T ].
Proof: Follows from Corollary 2 by simply replacing relaxed controls by Dirac measures
concentrated at {uot : t ∈ [0, T ]} ∈ U
(N)
reg [0, T ] or U
(N),zu
reg [0, T ].
The optimality conditions are derived based on the assumption that the filtration FT is gen-
erated by the system Brownian motions {W (t) : t ∈ [0, T ]}. When this condition does not hold
the optimality conditions are slightly modified as discussed in the next remark.
Remark 4. Suppose FT is not generated by Brownian motions {W (t) : t ∈ [0, T ]} but stochastic
integrals with respect to W (·) are FT−martingales. Then by invoking the variation of the semi
martingale representation due to Kunita-Watanabe (for the derivation see [41]) we have the
following. If (i) : L2(Ω,F,P) is separable and (ii): FT is right continuous having left limits,
then any square integrable FT martingale has the decomposition
m(t) = m(0) +
∫ t
0
v(s)ds+
∫ t
0
Σ(s)dW (s) +M(t), t ∈ [0, T ], (80)
for some v ∈ L2
FT
([0, T ],Rn), Σ ∈ L2
FT
([0, T ],L(Rm,Rn)), Rn−valued F0,0−measurable random
variable m(0) having finite second moment, and {M(t) : t ∈ [0, T ]} right continuous square
integrable FT martingale, which is orthogonal to {W (t) : t ∈ [0, T ]}. This representation
is unique. Further, the stochastic integrals
∫ t
0
Σ(s)dW (s) and
∫ t
0
Γ(s)dM(s) are orthogonal
martingales for L2 integrands. In this case the adjoint equation given by (38), (39) is replaced
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by
dψ(t) =−Hx(t, x(t), ψ(t), Q(t), ut)dt+Q(t)dW (t) + dM(t), t ∈ [0, T ) (81)
ψ(T ) =ϕx(x(T )). (82)
In view of the results obtained, we confirm that there are no limitations in applying classical
theory of optimization to decentralized systems. Rather, the challenge is in the implementation
of the new variational Hamiltonians and the computation the optimal strategies for specific
examples. In Part II [38] of this two-part paper, we shall apply these optimality conditions to
investigate various linear and nonlinear distributed stochastic team games and obtain closed form
expressions for the optimal strategies for some of them.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper we have considered team games for distributed stochastic dynamical decision
systems, with decentralized noiseless information patterns for each DM, under relaxed and
deterministic strategies. Necessary and sufficient optimality conditions with respect to team
optimality and person-by-person optimality criteria are derived, based on Stochastic Pontryagin’s
minimum principle, while we also discussed existence of the optimal strategies.
The methodology is very general, and applicable to many areas. However, several additional
issues remain to be investigated. Below, we provide a short list.
(F1) For team games with regular strategies and non-convex action spaces Ai, i = 1, 2, . . . , N ,
if the diffusion coefficients depend on the decision variables then it is necessary to derive
optimality conditions based on second-order variations. The methodology presented to
derive the necessary conditions of optimality can be easily extended to cover this case
as well.
(F2) The derivation of optimality conditions can be used in other type of games such as
Nash-equilibrium games with decentralized information structures for each DM, and
minimax games.
(F3) The optimality conditions can be extended to distributed stochastic dynamical decision
systems driven by both continuous Brownian motion processes and jump processes,
such as Le´vy or Poisson jump processes, by following the procedure of centralized
strategies in [36].
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(F4) The optimality conditions can be applied to specific examples with decentralized noise-
less information structures. Some of these are presented in the companion paper [38].
(F5) The methodology can be extended to cover decentralized partial (noisy) information
structures.
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